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EMME'T MATTHEW HALL: THE ACTIVIST AS JUSTICE
By FREDERICK VAUGHAN*
I was tempted to write exclusively on Mr. Justice Hall's judicial activism,
but, as the title is intended to suggest, one cannot speak of his judicial
activism without noting that it is a function of his broader social activism.1
Accordingly, as a prelude to a discussion of the judicial form of his activism,
I shall focus on the scope and main background forces of Justice Hall's social
activism.2 I shall conclude this section with a few observations on the content
of his social philosophy and the impact it has had on the formation of his
judicial values and attitudes. It is my hope that such preliminary remarks
will not only provide the necessary background to the more important subject
of Justice Hal's judicial activism, but that it will also guide us in understand-
ing that aspect of his activism more fully.
My main objective is to provide the reader with the material for a deeper
insight into the character of the man regarded today as Canada's leading
civil libertarian on the bench.
Health Services and Education
The breadth of Justice Hall's involvement in the social problems of our
times continues to amaze people. It not only encompasses the legal and social
aspects of law reform, but such pressing problems as education, and medical
care for the needy, including Canada's native peoples. Nor does his involve-
ment diminish as he progresses up the judicial order. In fact, if there is a
pattern it appears to be that the higher he goes, the more involved he be-
comes. Few Canadians are unaware of Justice Hall's part in the Royal Com-
mission on Health Services which resulted in a national medical care scheme; 3
*Associate Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Studies, University of
Guelph.
'This is, of course, not unique to Justice Hall; the late Justice Hugo Black's
activism can be understood in light of his political involvement; so too can Justice
Murphy's, see W. Howard, Mr. Justice Murphy (Princeton University Press, 1968).
See also J. D. Weaver, Warren: The Man, The Court, The Era (Boston: Little, Brown,
1967).
2 Justice Hall's direct political activism has been minimal. He was a political can-
didate twice (once municipally and once provincially), but was unsuccessful both times.
He was elected to the Saskatoon Separate School Board from 1949-1957. I make no
pretence to deny or obscure the fact that Justice Hall had been active (behind the
scenes) in the Progressive Conservative Party before being appointed to the bench.
Nor am I ignorant of the fact that he was appointed to the Supreme Court of
Saskatchewan and the Supreme Court of Canada by John Diefenbaker, an old personal
friend and law school classmate. Despite this, however, there is no evidence to suggest
that his political and social values have been influenced by this association or experience.
There can be no doubt about it, however, that John Diefenbaker appointed him to the
bench because Justice Hall shared his passion for criminal justice and the rights of the
individual.
$Justice Hall considers this to be his most important non-judicial achievement.
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or his contribution to the reform of education in Ontario through the propo-
sals embodied in "Living and Learning", the so-called Hall-Dennis Report.
These are only two of his more recent and more important contributions.
The excellence of the former led the Public Health Association of the United
States to present him with its highest award for achievement in public health,
the Bronfman Medal.4 The latter report has resulted in nation-wide debate
on the nature of the reforms required in elementary and secondary education.
The speeches which Justice Hall gave in defence of the report of the
Royal Commission on Health Services contain an account of the depth of his
personal commitment to the cause of national health standards. He remains to
this day firmly convinced that the Charter for a national health program was
an essential contribution to national unity - incomplete as yet because,
despite the acceptance of medicare by the provinces, the native peoples of
Canada have yet to feel the benefit of the Commission's recommendations.
Until they do Justice Hall sees his work as only partially implemented.
Beneath his concern for adequate health and education standards and
facilities rests his fixed commitment to broad social values. One of the most
fundamental is the fear that the economic or materialistic criteria will domi-
nate thinking and work to the destruction of "genuine human values". Ours
is an era, he warns, where "material abundance and ample leisure seems a
distinct possibility ... such an era could result in an increasing degree of
dehumanization unless our basic human values and institutions are strength-
ened to withstand this onslaught." 5 Permeating all his writings and speeches
is the dual concern for those forces which tend to dehumanize men as well
as the need to embody in legislation the basic humanitarian values which he
believes are proper to civilized men.
It becomes clear after a review of Justice Hall's papers that his vision
and intensity of energy are the product of his passion for "social justice"
which he conceives as social welfare in action. "We seem, in a sense, to have
become 'social minded' in that we now believe than an individual or an
individual family should not have to bear alone the full costs of risks that
could happen to any one of us. Accordingly, we now believe that if the
resources of the whole can be used to strengthen the ability of families and
individuals to manage and plan for themselves, then they should be so used.
There is evident today a ground surge very wide in scope that seeks to aid
in freeing the world of hunger, poverty and intolerance and war; a movement
that seeks justice and particularly social justice and it is making progress
on many fronts.""
4 Presented at San Francisco, Thursday, November 3, 1966. The citation accom-
panying the award reads in part: "The Hall Report will stand as one of the major,
influential documents in the history of world health, an enduring monument to thejudgment and helmsmanship of Mr. Justice Emmett Hall."
5 "Implications of a Health Charter for Canadians," keynote address, prepared for
delivery to the National Conference on Health Services, at Ottawa, November 28,
1965, at 11. (Note: all references to unpublished speeches and addresses are to the
Hall Papers in the author's possession).
6 "Social Justice - Safeguard of Human Rights," an address to the Women's
Canadian Club of Ottawa, January 15, 1969, at 12.
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Justice Hall is an egalitarian who believes that society should provide
access to medical and educational facilities for all its peoples. Accordingly,
the Health Services Commission took its bearings from the World Health
Organization Charter which proclaimed that
The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the funda-
mental rights of every human being without discrimination of race, religion,
political belief, economic or social condition. The health of all peoples is funda-
mental to the attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon the fullest
cooperation of individuals and states.7
Before specifying in detail the recommendations of the report, Justice
Hall paused to assert that the fundamental feature of the Charter is that of
freedom: "services are to be rendered by free and independent, self-governing
professions, and those seeking health services are to be as free to choose as
they have always been.' 8 And so, while government is to be involved, doctors
are not to be employees of the state - i.e. while the scheme involves govern-
ment it is not socialistic.
Long before he became involved in the Ontario Royal Commission on
Education, Justice Hall expressed the conviction that education and health
are partners, the one aiding the other. His goal in health is to raise access
to adequate health services to the level of that available to all Canadians in
education. "The right to education is one now universally recognized in
Canada. It is an entrenched right which no one would dare to challenge. It
is now beyond question that all our young people must be better educated
and more competently trained if Canada is to survive in this highly compe-
titive age of specialization and automation. It is equally true that health
services are as much as investment as education. Health services and educa-
tion must now be regarded as twin endeavours, advancing mankind." 9
The concern for Canada's native peoples permeates all Justice Hall's
non-judicial writings and not a few of his judicial judgments. He has been
loud in his denunciation of the neglect of Canadian Indians and Eskimos.
"We, as a nation," he once proclaimed, "have failed our Indians and
Metis."' 0 He never tired of relating the depth of degredation into which the
Canadian nation has permitted Indians and Eskimos to remain. Armed with
the statistics of the Commission of the Northwest Territories report, the
Royal Commission on Health Services recommended an imaginative plan for
organized flying health service circuits, not unlike judicial circuits. "It would
bring regular visits several times a year, by health personnel to the scattered
communities and the Yukon and the Northwest Territories."'" Not blind to
the fact that adequate health services are not in themselves the answer to
the problems of the North, the Hall Commission went beyond the question of
7 Canada. Royal Commission on Health Services, (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer
1964-65) Vol. 1, at 6. [Hereinafter Royal Commission on Health].
8 
"Implications of a Health Charter for Canadians," at 16.
9 Royal Commission on Health, Vol. II, at 18.
10 "Dr. Donald Thomas Fraser Memorial Lecture," prepared for delivery at Ed-
monton, June 1, 1965 at the meeting of the Canadian Public Health Association at 11.
1 Id., at 13.
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health and concluded that the "eventual solution must result in employment
opportunities for the people of the North if the region is to become more
than merely a base for weather stations, scientific outposts, or defence instal-
lations manned by personnel on a temporary basis. '12
Due to the close liaison between health and education, it is no surprise
that many of the same themes emerge in Justice Hall's explanation and justi-
fication for the recommendations contained in Living and Learning, the
report of the Ontario Royal Commission on Education. At every opportunity,
Justice Hall reiterates his belief that the educational process is in danger of
being programmed in terms of economic efficiency. "Unless a people is on
its guard, the economic demands of society can be made to determine what
is done in education. The society whose educational system gives priority to
the economic over the spiritual and emotional needs of man, defines its
citizens in terms of economic units and in so doing debases them. There is
a dignity and nobility of man that has nothing to do with economic con-
siderations. The development of this dignity and nobility is one of education's
tasks." 13 Indeed, the entire concept of "marketable skills" is loaded with
fallacies in his view. Education has one major aim: the development of
manhood, i.e. the intellectual discipline which will provide children with the
means by which they will become morally conscious and responsible adults.
All levels of the educational process must be designed to provide the maxi-
mum flexibility commensurate with the varied native capacities and interests
of all students. A clear egalitarian tone pervades Living and Learning. As
in the case of access to the best health services, the best education must be
made available to all Canadians and not just a privileged portion. Yet there
is an equally firm commitment to the belief that the kind of education favored
by the Hall-Dennis commission will maximize responsibility and serve as a
rebuff to the trends towards mass tastes and mass conformity. Underlying his
convictions in both health and education is the clear commitment to indivi-
dualism - an individualism which is not in any way to be confused with the
rugged individualism of nineteenth century economic thought. The brand of
individualism espoused by Justice Hall comprises the individual acceptance
of a social commitment along with the recognition of what kind of responsi-
bility is attached to the freedom he is proclaiming. "Responsibility is the
keynote of the new day we see in education - responsibility linked with
freedom; for freedom with responsibility imposes greater limitations on man's
predatory inclinations and arbitrary actions than shackles of steel or fear of
punishment; for they are limitations imposed by the intellect, limitations
voluntarily accepted in recognition of man's responsibility to his fellow man
and not as a license to ride roughshod over the rights of others, or in a
violation of them." 4
The above citation makes it clear that Justice Hall has a clear view of
the social nature and responsibility of man. What should also be clear is
12 Id., at 14.
13An address to the National Conference on Medical Action for Mental Health,
1970, at 5.
14 Id., at 22.
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that he is no unqualified modem liberal. Despite the fact that he must be
categorized as a liberal because of his overriding emphasis on freedom, his
commitment to a brand of individualism which emphasizes social duty rather
than rights flowing from freedom marks him as conservative. Furthermore,
Justice Hall's liberalism does not permit him to discard the great heritage of
the past; the great institutions and customs of history are dear to him. For
this reason he cannot countenance the efforts of the radical cause bent on
destruction in the name of a utopian order. But, then, neither does he
acquiesce in the prevailing injustices. This is why he keeps in touch with the
activist literature of the times - see for example the indirect reference to
The Greening of America in his speech to the John White Society published
in this issue of the Supreme Court Review.
Justice Hall is deeply concerned about the modern trends, such as
automation, which impersonalize and dehumanize modern lives. In an effort
to prevent the modem trends from engulfing men, he urges politicians in
particular to become conscious of the corrosive effects many current trends
have and to become fully aware of the fundamental values and principles
upon which the just political order must be erected.
When one distills the non-judicial writings of Justice Hall, one finds a
clearly conscious view of the nature of the individual as well as a concept
of the state which flows from that view. In this connection there can be little
doubt that Justice Hall's personal values, in particular his strong Catholicism,
have had an impact. It is always dangerous to attempt to explain an intelligent
adult's behaviour in terms of early formal and informal influences; one can
only speculate on the extent to which Justice Hall's early religious education
played a part in shaping his basic values. Nevertheless, in the present in-
stance one can find very clear similarity of views expressed by Justice Hall
and the great social encyclicals of the Catholic church - i.e. Rerum Nova-
rum, Quodragesimo Anno and above all, Pope John's major social pro-
nouncement, Pacem in Terris. Justice Hall has never disguised his open and
active membership in the Roman Catholic Church - he was a Grand
Knight of Columbus at a time in Saskatchewan when the Ku Klux Klan was
making an appearance on the scene. He even had the dubious honor of
being burned in effigy by the Ku Klux Klan.
Perhaps these fundamental values provide a partial key to Justice Hall's
actions on and off the bench, but most people are more complex. And
Justice Hall is no exception. As Schmidhauser says: "It is not at all clear
that the social and political background factors in themselves may serve as
reliable indicators of precise patterns of judicial behaviour ... Complete
dependence upon background factors would also ignore the complexity and
subtlety of intellect and motivation."'15 The fact that he was able to depart
from his family's longstanding political preference for the Liberal Party and
15 J. Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court: Its Politics, Personalities and Procedures,
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960) at 57. See also, J. Grossman, Social
Backgrounds and ludicial Decision-Making (1965-66), 79 Harv. L Rev. 1551. A good
example of where Justice Hall's non-judicial involvement did not interfere with his
judgment can be seen in Ares v. Venner, [1970] S.C.R. 608.
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actively support the Progressive Conservatives in Saskatchewan attests to his
independence.
Background factors do, nevertheless, provide some guidance. There can
be no doubt, for example, that his having been born in Quebec has had a
profound influence on his sympathetic attitude to French Canadian aspira-
tions. A clear commitment to the family, to orthodox Christian morality and a
legal order directed towards justice pervades all Justice Hall's nonjudicial
writings and emerges frequently in his judicial writings as we shall see later.
Justice Hall's view of the role of government and the extent of its social
obligations also provides 'us with insights into his basic scheme of values. A
brief glance at the recommendations of the monumental report of the Royal
Commission on Health is sufficient to conclude that Justice Hall considers
it proper and necessary for the government to assume an active role in
formulating and implementing social policy. Indeed the main instrument of
achieving social justice in his view is government. The first and most import-
ant of the Royal Commission recommendations is a directive addressed to
the Federal Government to "enter into agreements with the provinces to
provide grants on a fiscal need formula to assist the provinces to introduce
and operate comprehensive, universal, provincial programs of personal health
services, with similar arrangements for the Yukon and the Northwest Terri-
tories."16
But he was not content with merely recommending. After the Report
was formally presented to Prime Minister Pearson, Justice Hall never lost an
opportunity to urge in public the recommendations of the Commission. This
outspoken support for the recommendations caused many in official govern-
ment quarters to question whether such activity was proper to a justice of
the highest court in the land. Judy LaMarsh, at the time Minister of National
Health and Welfare, openly resented this manner of lobbying and, true to
her fashion, said so in no uncertain terms.1 7
The fact of the matter is, however, that Justice Hall saw little difficulty
with publicly advocating the reforms recommended by the Royal Commis-
sion. The fact that he was a high court judge did not detract from the fact
that he had been a party to a study which uncovered a widespread public
deficiency and had recommended that it be remedied "with urgency". It
would have been foreign to his character to submit such a report and then
forget about it. When one comes to know the man one soon realizes that
once his attention has been directed to a social ill, nothing will contain his
Irish passion for a solution. In the matter of health care Justice Hall had
been a party to recommending the solution and so it was natural that he
wanted it implemented as soon as possible. It is clearly impossible for him
to sort his actions into role categories, now acting as a judge, now as a royal
commissioner. He viewed his obligations as a Royal Commissioner to include
the implementation of his recommendations. Furthermore, how could he
10 Royal Commission on Health Vol. 1, 19.
17 Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage, (Toronto: MeClelland and Stewart, 1968)
at 120.
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be urging the law schools and lawyers to assume a more active role in social
reform and not be involved himself?
Lawyers as Activists
Most people assume that lawyers will be conservative - not merely in
the sense that they will be dedicated to preserving the accumulation of justice
over many centuries, but that they will tend to resist fundamental political
and social change. It is only in recent years that the law schools have begun
to question this general past trend. The younger law professor (many of
whom have been educated at Yale under McDougal and Lasswell) have
begun to view this tradition as a form of complicity in injustice. As a result
they have begun to turn out young lawyers more determined to work for the
rights on the inner-city poor, for environmental and consumer causes, rather
than for a shingle on the most prestigious corporate law firm.
But this new trend is not going unchallenged either in Canada or the
United States (which must be acknowledged as the chief incubator for the
new brand of legal activism). U.S. Attorney General John N. Mitchell re-
cently castigated those "young people... going into law because they antici-
pate using the courts to effect social change."' 8 Mr. Mitchell reminded young
law students that it was the duty of the legislative process to effect basic
changes. In place of a misguided ambition to effect change through law,
Mitchell counselled judicial self-restraint. History will testify, he continued,
"that such 'judicial self-restraint' - the refusal to substitute will for judg-
ment - is precisely the quality that most distinguishes a great judge."' 9
Addressing himself to those who aspired to judicial office, Mitchell warned
that the courts "are not intended to initiate but only to respond."20
It would be difficult to find a view of the lawyer's and the judge's role
more at variance with that espoused by Justice Hall. When a case comes
before him his first question is not whether the court has jurisdiction, but
whether an injustice has been committed. If so, he then looks to see whether
the court can properly entertain the case.
Unlike Attorney-General Mitchell, Justice Hall believes that law schools
must, as of duty, play a strong role in law reform. "They must be the ini-
tiators of research into legal anachronisms and of desirable changes; they
must form the judges and magistrates who will deal mainly with people as
people and not as incidentals to legal problems. Beside making our lawyers
and judges learned in the law, and that is necessary, we must school them
in psychology, in human relations, in the elements of natural justice. These
are the stuff of justice-in-action attainable principally by your concentrated
efforts." 2' 1 His concern for educating judges is never far below the surface of
his writings on legal education. Justice Hall believes that the law schools
18 John N. Mitchell, Not Will, but ludgment (1971), 57 A.B.AJ. 1185.
19Id., at 1186.
2OId., at 1187.
21 An Address to the Association of Canadian Law Teachers, Ottawa, June 9,
1967, at 8.
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have a lot to learn from the medical schools. "It is my view that the reforms
of the future will be incubated in and emerge from the law schools as is now
the case in the medical sciences both at the graduate and undergraduate
levels. It is in the law school that the ideal of justice must remain forever
untarnished; to be carried thence to Parliament and the legislative bodies and
administered in courts by judges formed in those law schools; the whole
in an unbroken chain." 22
A passion for the cause of natural justice leads him to scorn the efforts
of those who attempt to discredit the notion and reduce it to an empty phrase.
In addition to this kind of judicial reform, Justice Hall sees lawyers
becoming more involved in permanent or standing committees such as law
reform commissions. Above all, he sees the need for small expert bodies to
be continuously aiert to reforms in the law.
Let us turn now to Justice Hal's basic jurisprudential principles. This
will not only cast general light on his activism but should be specifically
helpful for the later discussion of his performance on the Supreme Court of
Canada. Justice Hall makes no pretense to be a formal student of juris-
prudence; his formal legal education or study did not go beyond the basic
law degree from the University of Saskatchewan which he completed in 1919.
Nevertheless, his years as a practitioner and as a judge of the Saskatchewan
courts and the Supreme Court of Canada provided him with more than
sufficient opportunity to reflect on the fundamental principles of the law.
Since, however, his main area of professional interest has been the criminal
law it will be no surprise to find that his reflections focus on that branch of
the law. In other words, Justice Hall's reflections on constitutional juris-
prudence are less complete than his reflections on the criminal law. It is not
unusual to find, therefore, that his judgments in constitutional questions
tend to defer to the reasons of his brother judges.23
Justice Hall's general jurisprudence stands in stark contrast to the body
of jurisprudence propounded by such as Hans Kelsen. Justice Hall could
never acquiesce in the proposition that there exists an autonomous legal
order, or that the judge's duty is to elicit and apply neutral principles after
the manner proposed by Herbert Weschler. For, while never denying that the
law is an instrument for social control, Justice Hall is emphatic in the claim
that the law has a precise and clear social function. It is "an agency for
achieving a more decent and human society. '24 In a recent address to the
Law Faculty at the University of Toronto, Justice Hall summarized his views
regarding the function of law and the role of lawyers. He spoke of the
lawyer's role in seeking "social progress", i.e. of the lawyer's "special and
22 Id., at 3, 4.
23 For an indication of Justice Hall's overall voting patern, see, S. R. Peck, The
Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-66: A Search for Policy through Scalogram Analysis,(1967), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 666, especially at 713-722 where Peck discusses "The Criminal
Law Scale."
2 4 Lawyers and Canadian Criminal Law in the Seventies, The Law Society of
Upper Canada Gazette, Vol. V. No. 1, March 1971, at 25.
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unique responsibility to be in the vanguard of social change." 25 Justice Hall
urged his audience to assume an activist role towards "all problems of our
society, social or economic, even though they do not have a strictly legal
base."26 Arguing that because most of the problems confronting society are
not legal problems he concluded that "we lawyers cannot restrict our horizons
to traditional legal problems and we as lawyers must be willing to assume
responsibility not only for the machinery of justice but as well for other
social, economic and political institutions."27 The young lawyers, in particular,
must become fully conscious of the deep social ills or injustices and work
to eliminate them. His invitation is constantly to shed the traditional role
of the lawyer as simply an agent of a narrow legal order. He must be more
than that. He must seek out the prevailing causes of social and political
unrest, such as poverty, and seek to eliminate them. "If we want freedom
under law we must seek out and eradicate injustice. Injustice condoned will
lead to revolution or anarchy and the suppression of anarchy leads to the
police state."28 The lawyer's first duty must be to ferret out the inequities in
the civil and criminal law and procedure. That is his minimum legal obliga-
tion. In addition, he must work to eliminate poverty but since the law can
do little here the lawyer must become involved in those movements which
are bent on removing hunger and want. "The law cannot help the poor until
a decent standard of living is seen as a legal right. 29
The law schools must begin, therefore, to place greater emphasis on
the social and political causes of poverty. Justice Hall is saying, in effect,
that the law schools must begin to assist young lawyers form a strong social
conscience as a prelude to technical legal training. One would be overly
optimistic if one were to expect that the law schools would follow this
advice, contrary as it is to the thinking of those law professors who claim
that law is a technical value free craft and the further removed from value
judgments the better. Justice Hall is fully conscious of this trend and that
is why he rarely refuses the opportunity to expound the opposing view in
law schools. The learned judge is in many respects repeating the thoughts
of Julius Stone who wrote that "Fact-gathering, and even 'scientific' genera-
lization about facts gathered ... [can] not give more than a foundation for
the central questions of the democratic legal order. These central questions
[are] concerned with what should be done about the facts; they [are] ques-
tions of ethics, social policy, and justice."30
Justice Hall makes no pretense to offer a complete jurisprudence; he
merely wishes to redirect the attention of those who teach and practise the
law away from a sterile formalism or the so-called scientific law. He would
have agreed with Arthur Vanderbilt who wrote that no matter how vast
25 Id.
26 Id. Italics added.
27 Id.
28 Id., at 27.
29 Id.
30 Julius Stone, Law and The Social Sciences (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 1966) at 18, 19.
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and complex modem law has become, it can stay "vital in content, efficient
in operation and accurate in aim," by borrowing truths "from the political,
social and economic sciences." and "from philosophy." 31 It is not sufficient in
Justice Hall's view that the law adopt the mechanical techniques of the
social sciences (including statistics) but that it revive the philosophical ap-
proach to the study of "first principles" in the interest of achieving clarity
on the great and far more important social questions or aims which the legal
order must attempt to implement and preserve.
The most obvious or pervading concern of Justice Hall's jurisprudence
is the cause of the individual. This stands in contrast to those who view the
prime role of the courts as the preservation of the legal order and the author-
ity of legitimate government. For Justice Hall the criminal law and those
(all too few) devoted to its practice is directed "to answer social needs." 32
He castigates criminal lawyers for their lack of wider concern. "[We] have
often become so engrossed with the manipulation of procedure and technique
that we have sometimes tended to lose sight of the major goal of the whole
system, which is the control of crime - the elimination of crime. 33 The
lawyer's traditional role has been to become involved after the fact - i.e.
,he appears as defence counsel after a crime has been committed. Justice
Hall is urging lawyers and the legal profession to begin to play a larger prior
role, i.e. with the causes of crime.34
The focus is always on the active duty of the courts and law enforcement
agencies to serve the interests of the individual. "There may be much the
courts can do to ensure that the police respect the rights of an accused, and
this is undoubtedly a task for the courts - to protect citizens from excess
of authority, not only police authority, but all authority under its inherent
power to prevent abuse or misuse of its process whether by the prosecution
or by militant defendants or on their behalf."35 But even here his emphasis
is on the need for better trained and more professionalized police rather than
"reliance on confessions and on evidence illegally obtained and a new role
for the police in the community."36 As with lawyers, police must become
involved before the fact by assuming a new role in the community less
associated with their traditional punitive role.
Much of Justice Hall's public non-judicial statements could be subsumed
under the title of "Addresses to Lawyers to Awaken to the True Scope of
Their Profession." According to Justice Hall, lawyers are social activists by
virtue of their calling to the law. No other group shares the intimate contact
with our social problems as do lawyers, no other group has the opportunity
to see the diverse issues and problems of humanity so clearly.
31 The Law Center (1946), 32 A.B.AJ. 569.
32 For a similar lament, read the 1966 presidential address of J. T. Weir, Q.C.,
LL.D., delivered to the Canadian Bar Association 48th annual meeting in Winnipeg,
Monday 29 August, 1966.
33 See, supra, note 24 at 29.
341d., at 31.
35 Id., at 29.
36Id., at 30.
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"I am suggesting to you," he said to students and faculty at the Univer-
sity of Toronto Law School, "that we as lawyers have a responsibility to see
that ... needed reforms are brought about even though they do not concern
us directly in that part of other criminal justice system we have traditionally
thought our own."' 3 Louis Brandeis warned, Justice Hall reminded his
audience, that "the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." 38 The lawyer's
education should provide him with the understanding by which to effect the
necessary social and political reforms. Without his assistance the reformer
becomes frustrated and seeks extra-judicial or revolutionary means of bring-
ing about reforms. Justice Hall pleads for lawyers to shed the image, all too
frequently attributed to them, of being agents of an unjust social and political
order. Lawyers must take the initiative and take their place at the forefront
of reform. "We must use our skill to act as lobbyists, drafting legislation and
pressing for its enactment."'39
The Activist as Judge
David J. Danelski has written that "when Supreme Court Justices
dissent by themselves, the cases are likely to involve their top values." 40
Justice Hall's lone dissent in The Truscott case4' bears witness to Danelski's
statement. For, despite the fact that Justice Hall had good reason to believe
that at least two of his brother justices would join him in dissent, he found
himself in lone dissent on the question of evidence. Perhaps some will say
that he was able to be so irate (and he made no attempt to conceal his irri-
tation) because he alone of the Court was not present when the case came
on appeal from the Court of Appeal for Ontario on February 24, 1960.
Justice Hall was fully aware that the Governor in Council was in essence
asking the Court to reconsider its previous judgment and even run the risk of
admitting that it had erred in not accepting the appeal in 1960. But the facts
were so clearly contrary to a fair trial in Justice Hall's view that no alterna-
tive presented itself but to demand a new trial. It was a moment of great
anguish to him when he found himself standing alone in dissent. He had
studied the case meticulously and had considered every nuance before con-
cluding that the "conviction should be quashed and a new trial directed.142
With biting directness, he stated in terms not to be mistaken: "I take the
view that the trial was not conducted according to law. Even the guiltiest
criminal must be tried according to law."43 The Truscott conviction was
based exclusively on circumstantial evidence. While admitting that circum-
37 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id., at 33.
4 0 Cited by S. Ulmer, Political Decision-Making (New York: Van Nostrand Rein-
hold, 1970) at 126. See also, Danelski, Values as Variables in Judicial Decision-Making
(1966), 19 Vand. L.Rev. at 721.
41 In the Matter of a Reference re: Steven Murray Truscott, [1967] S.C.R. 309 at
382.
42 Id., at 383.
43 Id.
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stantial evidence can at times be sufficient to convict an accused, Justice
Hall concluded in the instant case that there were grave errors in the trial
brought about principally by "Crown Counsel's method in trying to establish
guilt and by the learned Trial Judge's failure to appreciate that the course
being followed by the Crown would necessarily involve the jury being led
away from objective appraisal by the evidence for and against the prisoner." 44
No matter how he looked at it, the original conviction was the product of a
bad trial and, he insisted, "A bad trial remains a bad trial. The only remedy
for a bad trial is a new trial. '45
There are few dissents on record in which a Justice of the Supreme
Court castigates more roundly Crown Counsel, the Trial Judge or the opinion
of his brother judges. The Hall dissent in the Truscott case must go down as
one of the great dissents in Canadian judicial history. But it was not written
with that possibility in mind. To this day Justice Hall remains angry at the
failure of the Supreme Court of Canada to see what was so patently clear
to him - Steven Murray Truscott received a bad trial and that the court
ought to have admitted that it erred in not accepting the appeal seven years
earlier.
The Truscott case leaves little doubt that Justice Hall has firm convic-
tions on the question of evidence and the criminal law in general and that
he is prepared to stand alone, if necessary, in defence of those convictions.
And while one can say that he failed to convince the court in Truscott of his
strict view of evidence, no one can say that he has not made an important
contribution in removing the confusion surrounding exculpatory and incul-
patory statements in evidence. Writing for the Court in Pichg v. The Queen,46
Justice Hall wrote that it was high time the Supreme Court cleared up the
confusion in this matter and thereby alleviate matters for the lower courts.
"In my view the time is opportune for this Court to say that the admission in
evidence of all statements made by an accused to persons in authority,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, is governed by the same rule and thus
put to an end the continuing controversy and necessary evaluation by trialjudges of every such statement which the Crown proposes to use in chief or
on cross-examination as either being inculpatory or exculpatory. ' 47 After
reviewing the relevant precedents, Justice Hall concluded for the court that
there "is no distinction to be drawn between inculpatory and exculpatory
statements as such in so far as their admissibility in evidence when tendered
by the Crown. '48 If the statement was given voluntarily it may be admitted
in evidence; if not given voluntarily and the trial judge so rules, then it will
not be admitted.
Justice Hall has taken a clear stand that the evidence against alleged
habitual criminals must be so clear as to eliminate any doubt that the accused
44 Id., at 384.
45 Id., at 390.
40 [19711 S.C.R. 23.
4TId., at 36.
48 Id., at 40.
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is likely to commit a further offence. He dissented with Cartwright J., in
Klippert v. The Queen49 because the evidence did not warrant him to con-
clude that Klippert was likely to commit further crimes. Two years later in
Mendick v. The Queen,50 Justice Hall was with the majority in a 5-4 deci-
sion which ruled that the appellant was indeed judged correctly to be an
habitual criminal but that it was not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that
it was necessary for the protection of the public that the accused be sentenced
to preventive detention.
If Justice Hall can be said to have a judicial preoccupation it is with
ensuring that the Bill of Rights51 will become the firm foundation of the
Canadian protection of individual rights and liberties. This applies with
special reference to Canada's native peoples. For this reason Justice Hall
relished the opportunity for the Court to pronounce judgment on the conflict
between the provisions of the Indian Act 52 and the Bill of Rights. The oppor-
tunity came on appeal from the Territorial Court of Appeal in the case of
Joseph Drybones.53 In a short concurring opinion Justice Hall began by
equating the British Columbia precedent, Regina v. Gonzales"4 with the
famous U.S. case of Plessy v. Ferguson,55 a case in which the Court held the
"separate but equal" doctrine as consistent with the "equal protections of
the laws" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To affirm the lower court
conviction of Joseph Drybones would be tantamount, he asserted, to placing
the development of civil rights of Canadian Indians at the level enjoyed by
American blacks in 1896. The Court must do no less than the Warren Court
had done in Brown v. The Board of Education.5 6 "The social situations in
Brown v. The Board of Education and in the instant case are, of course, very
different, but the basic philosophic concept is the same. The Canadian Bill
of Rights is not fulfilled if it merely equates Indians with Indians in terms
of equality before the law, but can have validity and meaning only when,
subject to the single exception set out in S. 2, it is seen to repudiate discri-
mination in every law of Canada by reason of race, national origin, color,
religion or sex in respect of the human rights and fundamental freedoms set
out in S.1 in whatever way that discrimination may manifest itself not only as
between Indians and Indians but as between all Canadians whether Indian
or non-Indian." 57
As we saw in the matter of exculpatory and inculpatory statements,
Justice Hall believes that one of the major duties of the Supreme Court is to
remove ambiguity in those areas where continuing confusion can and fre-
quently does lead to error and injustice. Justice Hall has no narrow view of
49 [1967] S.C.R. 822.
50 [19691 S.C.R. 865.
51 The Canadian Bill of Rights S.C. 1960, c. 44 [Hereinafter The Bill of Rights].
52 R.S.C. 1952, c. 149.
53 [19701 S.C.R. 282; (1970), 71 W.W.R. 171.
54 (1962), 37 W.W.R. (N.S.) 257 (B.C.C.A.)
55 (1896), 153 U.S. 537.
56 (1954), 347 U.S. 483; 98 L. Ed. 873; 74 S. Ct. 686.
57 [19701 S.C.R. 282 at 300.
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his function or duty in those problems which many judges feel ought to be
solved by the legislature and not the courts. In Ares v. Venner,58 Justice Hall,
speaking for a unanimous five-man court, argued that the Court ought to
make a restatement of the hearsay rule. After acknowledging that there were
two schools of thought among judges - the one claiming that it was the
proper duty of the legislature to make such a clarifying restatement and the
other which says that it is the responsibility of the Court to do so - Justice
Hall came out in favor of the minority in the Privy Council precedent of
Myers v. The Director of Public Prosecutions.9 "Although the views of
Lords Donovan and Pearce are those of the minority in Myers, I am of the
opinion that this Court should adopt and follow the minority view rather
than resort to saying in effect: 'This judge-made law needs to be restated to
meet modern conditions but we must leave it to Parliament and the ten pro-
vincial legislatures to do the job.' ,6 The inconsistencies in judge-made law
must be rectified by judges. To defer to the legislatures in such matters is
for the court to default in its responsibilities.
This is not to say, however, that Justice Hall is prepared to enter that
part of law reform and law-making formally reserved for the legislative branch
of government, as his judgment in the breathalizer reference makes clear.61
Concurring with the majority, Justice Hall said: "notwithstanding that in my
view the Order in Council proclaiming parts only of S. 16 of the Criminal
Law Amendment Act, 1968-69, c. 38, may indicate on the part of the exe-
cutive a failure to live up to the spirit of what was intended by Parliament, I
am nevertheless bound to hold that the remedy does not lie with the Courts. ' 62
A mild rebuke for the failure of the Executive to live up to the spirit of the
Act was all he felt he could do to remind the Canadian Government that it
had erred in this matter. "Under our system of parliamentary responsible
government, the Executive is answerable to Parliament, and when Parlia-
ment, by enacting S. 120, gave the Executive a free hand to proclaim "any"
of the provisions of the Act ... the responsibility for the result rests with
Parliament which has the power to remedy the situation."63
For those who believed, as indeed Justice Ritchie did, that the Cana-
dian Bill of Rights ought to have been brought to bear in the case, Justice
Hall's opinion was a disappointment. Of the nine justices who sat on this case
(as they all must for cases referred under S. 55 of the Supreme Court Act),
Justice Ritchie alone applied and construed the Bill of Rights so as to con-
clude that the Criminal Law Amendment Act as proclaimed violated the
fundamental right of an accused to make a full defence.' 4 The main majority
58 [1970] S.C.R. 608.
69 [1965] A.C. 1001.
60 [1970] S.C.R. 608 at 625-26.
61 In the Matter of a Reference by the Governor General in Council concerning
the Proclamation of Section 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-69, [1970]
S.C.R. 777. [Hereinafter Breathalizer Reference].
32 Id., at 785.
63 Id.
(4 Id., at 798-799.
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judgment, that of Justice Judson, made no reference to the Bill of Rights.
Justice Laskin, speaking in his first Supreme Court judgment, dismissed the
appeal to the Bill of Rights as having been insufficiently elaborated.0 5 Few
recent Supreme Court of Canada judgments come as near to the Frankfurter
brand of judicial self-restraint (not to say legislative deference) as Justice
Laskin's judgment in this case. It was no surprise to Court watchers to see
Justice Laskin dismiss the Bill of Rights as easily as he did here. After what
he had written as a law professor, it came as no surprise. The surprise seems
to be the unofficial alliance on constitutional matters which tends to emerge
between Justice Hall and Justice Laskin since the latter's elevation to the
Supreme Court.66 Few would have predicted a more unlikely alliance, but
such an alliance emerges when one notes the fact that Justice Hall never
dissents from Justice Laskin's view in constitutional matters. In the so-called
"chicken and egg" case,67 the opinion of Justice Hall and Justice Laskin was
written by the latter who joined the unanimous Court with the claim that
the Manitiba regulation was an invasion of federal power in relation to S. 91
(2) of the BNA Act.
There is no intention of suggesting that Justice Hall is subservient to
the views of Justice Laskin. It is merely intended to note that Justice Hall's
judicial activism as it relates to restraint on government activity is clearly
influenced by the presence of the junior member of the Court. There can be
no disputing the fact that Justice Hall has great respect for the constitutional
opinions of Justice Laskin. The point being made here is that when Hall and
Laskin sit together on a constitutional question, Justice Hall is likely to defer
to the judgment of Justice Laskin. However legitimate and justifiable this may
be, it was a disappointment to some to see Justice Hall draw back from apply-
ing the Bill of Rights in the breathalizer case. That reference case was a far
greater importance than was readily apparent for the following reasons. First,
because the reference obscured the fact that a judgment had been handed
aown m the British Columbia Supreme Court in which the Court ruled the
Breathalizer amendment inoperative on the basis of the Bill of Rights. Second,
the Minister of Justice, Mr. John Turner, failed to ask the Supreme Court
specifically whether the Criminal Law Amendment Act as promulgated vio-
lated the Canadian Bill of Rights. And, third, the Supreme Court of Canada
failed to raise on its own initiative whether the Act violated the Canadian
Bill of Rights. There are only two references in the Supreme Court judg-
ments to the Bill of Rights, one by Justice Ritchie, as we have seen, and
another by Justice Laskin who dismissed it without substantive comment.
The Minister of Justice and the Supreme Court believed that (to quote
Justice Laskin) "the single issue in this case is the scope of the authority con-
65 Id., at 802.
66 See, for example, the following cases: Breathalizer Reference, [1970] S.C.R. 777;
A.-G. for Manitoba v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Assoc. et al., [1971] S.C.R. 689;
Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, [1971] S.C.R. 780 (in which Justice Hall
concurs in Justice Laskin's Ontario Court of Appeal judgment). See also, Government
of The Democratic Republic of The Congo v. Venne (1972), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 669 at
679, a case involving international law.
67 A.-G. for Manitoba v. Manitoba Egg & Poultry Association, [1971] S.C.R. at 704.
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ferred by S. 120. ''68 Put in these narrow terms the Court's task was to pass
judgment on the scope and exercise of the Executive powers of discretion
which the Court wisely claimed was beyond its powers to do. But was the
case as simple as the Court and the Minister of Justice asserted?
The Court's response was in the tradition of strict construction - even
the dissents of Justices Martland and Ritchie were mainly based on the proper
construction of the term "provision. 6 9
It is the contention of some that the Minister of Justice and the Supreme
Court of Canada were duty bound to ask whether the Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act as proclaimed violated the Canadian Bill of Rights. For Professor
Laskin, as he then was, wrote that the Canadian Bill of Rights "is addressed
to Parliament itself and to the Courts, admonishing the former not to enact,
and the latter not to construe, federal legislation in derogation of the declared
rights."' 70 Section 3 of the Bill of Rights specifically enjoins the Minister of
Justice to "examine every proposed regulations submitted in draft form to
the Clerk of the Privy Council pursuant to the Regulations Act and every Bill
introduced in or presented to the House of Commons, in order to ascertain
whether any of the provisions thereof are inconsistent with the purposes and
provisions of this Part."71 Professor Laskin predicted that this section may
turn out to be "the strongest feature of the Canadian Bill of Rights." 72 A
reasonable extension of this provision would seem to suggest that the Minister
of Justice is obliged to ask the Court whether the Criminal Law Amendment
Act as proclaimed did in fact constitute in its application an abridgment or in-
fringement of the rights and freedoms recognized and declared in the Cana-
dian Bill of Rights. This the Minister of Justice failed to do even though
Justice Monroe of the British Columbia Supreme Court had agreed that the
Act as proclaimed denied an accused adequate counsel as assured by the
Bill of Rights.
The Court felt obliged to restrict itself to the questions posed by the
Governor in Council and did not appear to give much weight to counsel's
arguments based on the Bill of Rights. Had the Court done so it would have
removed a problem that continues to confront the lower courts of the country.
Justice Hall was clearly in a quandary in this case but drew back from
construing the Bill of Rights as Justice Ritchie did because he feared that the
attempt to use it where it was not explicitly aplicable would hurt the cause
of those, such as himself, who wished to see it used effectively. He fears the
efforts of those (both in and out of the judiciary) who would rush in to apply
it at the least provocation. 73
68 [1970] S.C.R. 800.
69 Id., at 785-799.
7 0 Bora Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, 3rd ed., (Toronto: Carswell Co.,
1966) at 976. [Hereinafter Laskin].
71 8 -9 Elizabeth II, The Bill of Rights, Ch. 44, (1960) s. 3. (Italics added).
72 Laskin, at 976.
73 See, Smythe v. The Queen, [1971] S.C.R. 680; also Regina v. Veins (1970), 10
C.R.N.S. 363, (Ont. Prov. Ct.).
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For those who view the presence of Justice Hall as an assurance that
the Bill of Rights would become an important judicial instrument guarantee-
ing protection of civil liberties throughout Canada, the emergence of Justice
Laskin as a strong influential force on the Court is a diasppointment. Justice
Laskin has made his views clear on the subject of the Bill of Rights and just
how much power it accords to the Courts. As far back as 1962 Justice Laskin
wrote that "the Canadian Bill of Rights steers a middle course between a mere
innocuous statement or declaration of principle on the one hand and an
affirmative, enforceable set of directives on the other. Although it has a little
of the former, it has none of the latter."74 It is his firm conviction that the
"generalities of the Bill of Rights, unsupported by any enforcement provi-
sions to give it an independent validity, cannot be relied upon to open a new
chapter in judicial law-making." 75 This view stands in sharp contrast with
the view of Justice Hall who as Chief Justice of Saskatchewan, said that
"The Courts ... must be vigilant in seeing that the provisions of the Cana-
dian Bill of Rights are not breached, ignored or whittled away. ' 76 For Justice
Hall the Bill of Rights is a wedge which invites judges to enter into the area
of judicial activism. It puts onus on courts to identify and protect fundamental
rights. Justice Hall is in the great tradition of Blackstone who believed it to
be the proper function of the Courts to define fundamental rights and assure
their protection. 77
It should be clear by this point that Justice Hall has a clear view of
the Court's place in policy-making. In this respect he has been in the van-
guard of a new movement among some Canadian lawyers calling for a more
active judiciary even though this implies a challenge to the traditional rigid
Canadian understanding of Parliamentary supremacy.78 This traditional Cana-
dian approach is reinforced by "the dominant legal philosophy of the Cana-
dian judiciary" which is "English positivism."7 9 It is not surprising, therefore,
to find the new movement attempting to articulate a jurisprudence more in
keeping with the objectives of the new policy-oriented judicial activism.
74 Canada's Bill of Rights: A Dilemma for the Courts? (1962), 2 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 519 at 527. See also W. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill
of Rights (Toronto: Carswell Co., 1966) at 93.
7GLaskin at 533.
76 Shumiatcher v. A.-G. for Saskatchewan (1962), 133 C.C.C. 69 (Sask. CA.).
77See Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, (1778) ed. II at 3, 8, 9
and passim.
78 See, M. Cohen, The Judicial Process and National Policy - A Problem for
Canadian Federalism (1970), 16 McGill L J. 297. Also P. Weiler, Legal Values and
Judicial Decision-Making (1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev. 1. B. Strayer, Judicial Review of
Legislation in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968). For an account
of the reservations some scholars feel in this matter, see, S. Peck, 'The Supreme
Court's New Supremacy", Toronto Globe and Mail, March 14, 1970; J. Sinclair, The
Queen v. Drybones: The Supreme Court of Canada and The Canadian Bill of Rights
(1970), 8 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 599. The strongest recent case against the judicial
protection of civil liberties can be found in P. Russell's, A Democratic Approach to
Civil Liberties (1969), 19 U. of T. L. J. 109.
79J. Wood, Statutory Interpretation: Tupper and The Queen (1968), 6 Osgoode
Hall Law Journal 92.
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Conclusion
The future direction of Canadian jurisprudence and judicial behaviour is
clearly at stake in this relatively quiet but enormously important contest.
Justice Hall's role has been an important one because he has brought it to
the High Court. What remains now is for jurisprudents to provide the neces-
sary theoretical basis for the new Canadian judicial activism. The recent
writings of Professor Paul Weiler of Osgoode Hall Law School of York
University gives one reason to believe that the day is fast approaching when
that new jurisprudence will appear.80
80 See P. Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making (1968), 46 Can. Bar
Rev. 406; also, Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making (1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev.
1; also, Groping Towards A Canadian Tort Law: The Role of the Supreme Court of
Canada (1971), 21 U. of T. L.J. 267.
